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THE CAUSE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES BECOME UNPOPULAR?
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Today with few exceptions the championing of the
iddividualliberties guaranteed in our constitution has
become unpopularo The reason for such unfriendliness
apparently stems from the opinion that these liberties prevent
revelations of communist activity and corrupt pr_actices in
high places which are necessary for the preservation of the
nationo
No greater illustration of this antipathy is found
than in the ~boyant, inquisitorial congressional
investigation.
Without meaning to be cynical, we might infer
from the number and popularity of these investigations that
the congressmen and senators have embraced such an instrument
If thepolitical motives as much as legislative reasonso
investigation has become a weapon with which to wage political
warfare 
to embarrass and batter the opposing 'political party,
it follows that our representatives must be convinced that
such methods capture voteso We may cohclude then, that our
elected representatives evaluate the public temper as 
clamoring for exposure of communists and corruption at 
the expense of constitutional rights if need be. Thus 
impressive numbers of the public can be added to the list 
of those who desire to affirm present opinions and passions 
by dismantling the armor of rights that protect the 
individual from the seesaw of man's emotions. 
But what these persons and groups have forgotten 
is how often a policy has been shipwredked, which has 
thought to avail itself of great interests and great passions 
for some end immediately in view. 
In this setting and against these formilable odds, 
it has fallen upon the Supreme Court of the United States to 
remind the public and the other branches of the government 
that Constitutional rights do not bow to the spirit of the 
times. A review of their decisions on this subject reveals a 
return to principles that have passed XXI under the hammer 
of time and through the fire of debate. In short a restating 
of bedrock constitutional principles. The court is 
asserting the theory that when governmental action,whether 
motivated by opinions natural and familiar or novel and even 
shocking, conflicts with Constitutional rights such action 
becomes unlawfulo This simple principle affords the explana-
tion of the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of 
individual rights. A striking example of opi.ions to 
suestantiate this analysis is found in the cases dealing 
with contempt prosecutions of a witness who refused to 
answer questions asked by a congressional committee. 
In the latter part of the 1870's a special 
House Committee was inquiring into the nature and history of 
a "real estate p~" and transactions involved in the 
bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Co. The House resolution, which 
granted the Committee the power to compel testimony, stressed 
the government's interest in the case as a result of 
"improvident deposits" pi public money having been made with 
the London branch of the bankrupt company. The manager of 
the pool» Hallet Kilbourn, who had been brought before the 
Committ~to testify concerning the pool, refused to produce 
certain papers and declined to answer the question: "Will 
you state where each of the five members reside, and will 
you please state their names?" 
Kil~ourn, arrested by the sergeant-at-arms of the 
House of Representatives, was brought before the bar of the 
House where he still refused to comply with the Committee's 
requests. The House thereupon approved a resolution declaring 
him to be in contempt ana directed that he be kept in custody 
until he was ready to produce papers and asswer qhe question. 
Kilbourn was released after habeas corpus proceedings. He 
was unsuccessful in his suit agains~the sergeant-at-arms 
as well as the Speaker of the House and members of the 
Committee for false imprisonment. He appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Mr~ Justice Miller, speaking for the Court, 
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vigorously attacked the House resolution. "To inquire 
'-
into the nature and history of the real estate pool," he 
eaclaimed, "[how] indefinite~" He denounced the resolution 
as containing "no hint of any intention of final action by 
60ngress on the subject • • • Was it to be simply a fruitless 
investigation into the personal affairs of individuals? If 
s9,the House of Representives had no power or authority in 
the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen 
interested for the government of their county." 
The Kilbourn decision, therefore, required all 
investigations to have a clear and precise constitutional 
purpose. In addition the opinion supported the doc~rine 
that a broad area of the private affairs of citizens is 
immune from congressional scrutiny. 
The next significant ~ judicial exposition 
on investigations was provided in the ease of McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.'o 135. The controversy in this case 
arose in the course of an investigation by a Senate Committee 
into the administration of the Department of Justice under 
ex-Attorney General Harry Daughertyo The S~te resolution 
prvvided for the inquiry of alleged failures of Mr. 
Daugherty to prosecute and defend cases wherein the government 
of the United States was interested. During the hearings the 
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Committee served a subpoena on Mally Daugherty, the brother 
of Harry, requiring him to appear and testify and to bring 
with him certain of the records of the bank of which he was 
president o When he failed to appear, a second subpoena 
ordered him to come before the Committee, but made no 
reference to records orpaperso Againx the witness did not 
comply; nor did he offer any excuse. Mally Daugherty 
arrested, but released in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
The iupreme Court reversed. It was ruled that 
Congress had the power to compel the presence of witnesses 
before any of its committees to enable it efficiently to 
exetcise a legislative function belonging to it under 
Constitution. The court implied that the subject of inquiry 
was stated with sufficient definiteness, but notwithstanding 
it was made clear that Congress did not have an unfettered 
power to investigate. The court carefully pointed out that 
limitations do exist. The Kilbourn case was affirmed by 
agreeing that "neither house is invested with general power 
to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures," and 
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that "a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the 
bonds of the power are exceeded or the questions are not 
pertinent to the matter under inquiry." 
As much as these decisions are helpful in 
protecting witnesses, it was never determined precisely 
how far a committee may search into the private affairs of 
a citizeno To be sure the Fifth Amendment served as checks 
on the method used by committees, but the courts that spoke 
on the subject seemed reluctant to balk or interfere with 
procedures. (United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 5g.) 
With the naming of Earl Warren as Shief Justice 
the court embarked on a new era. After years of hot and 
cold war, which climate generated decisions favoring the state, 
the court rosefto breathe sptrit again into those Constitutional 
rights created to protect individuals. Specifically the ~O~~ 
plunged into the task of redefining the rules protecting 
witnesses at congressional investigations. 
In Quinn VO U.S. and Bart v. U.S., the court 
deClared that if a committee wishes to hold a witness for 
contempt it must specifically overrule his claim of privilege , -
under the Fifth Amendment and order him to answer. Any 
ambiguity on the committee's part will bar the prosecution 
of the witness. 
In clear language the 6hief Justice reasoned that 
"Unless the committee's ruling is ilade clear the witness is 
never confronted with a clear-cut choice between compliance 
and non compliance, between answering the ~estion ana 
risking prosecution for contempt •• 0 Our view, that a clear 
disposition of the witness' objection is a prerequisite 
to prosecution for contempt is supported by long-standing 
tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. 1t 
Thus, the court made it unequivocal,xx as it had 
in earlier cases, that Congress' investigative powers are 
limited by thetlspecific individual guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights. 1f 
The rush of membe~of Congress to investigate 
communism required the court to turn its attention to 
legislati ve enactments designed to facilitate such inquiries_,. 
The questions that arose were primarily those of federalism 
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but the court's rationale was clearly intended to protect 
witnesses from unfairness. Two cases illustrate this point. 
Under section 3486 of the Federal Criminal Code 
the use of testimony of a congressional committee witness 
is barred in a federal criminal prosecution against the 
witness. In Adams v. Maryland the question presented was 
whether the statute applied to the states, and thus precluded 
the use of such testimony in a state prosecution. A unanimous 
court ruled that the statute bars the use of such testimqny 
in such proceeding. 
A problem closely allied to that of Adams v. 
Maryland was decided in Ullmannv. U.S. IX xxx EXgxD nrt 
That case dealt with the prosecution of federal witnesses 
in the several states after testifying before a congressional 
committee under the Compulsory Testimony Act. The court 
ruled that the Aat prohibits state prosecutions as well as 
federal of federal witnesses for offenses aboub which they 
were compelled to testifyo 
Another variant of the ~ problem occurred \~ 
Offcut v. U.8. There an attorney was tried in a summary 
proceeding for contempt. The judge of this trial 
witnessed the alleged misconduct. The court upset the summary 
contempt sentence and remaaded the case for trial before 
another judge. It was the court's position that) in a 
proceeding of this type) determination of guilt and 
punishment should not be made by a judge who was involved 
with the conduct leading to the charge 
It is evident from all these cases that 
interest of the court lay in finding means for eliminating 
opinions from being the basis of censure. The norm it was 
seeking was fairness. 
It was during this period that the court recognized 
the need to forge new constitutional safeguards for witnesses 
appearing before legislative co~~ittees. The court was 
provided with the occasion to satisfy this need in the 
Watkins and Sweezy cases o 
In the Watkins decision the Chief Justice, speaking 
for the court, retiewed the limitations on Congressional 
investigations that had previously been delineated. He 
summarized these limitations as meaning that an investigation 
committee can ask no questions not related to a legislative 
purpose. This manner of phrasing the restriction is not 
new, but the elaboration of it by Chief Justice Warren 
added two significant features heretofore unknown. The 
first and most important is that a witness' perogative not 
to answer questions beyond ~ongress' power is protected 
by the First Amendment of the Constitution. It was stated 
that to be able to exercise this perogative not to answer 
questions, the witness must know (1) the questimn under inquiry 
and (2) whether that question is within the scope of the 
authority delegated to the Committee by the House or Senate. 
The first requirement el'_'nates the Hvi.e of vagueness, which 
obviously is aimed at providing basic fairness. The second 
element, however, appears aimed at restricting the scope 
of questions committees are wont to ask. The second novel 
feature the Chief Justice discusses is directed at elaborating 
this point. 
Throughout the opinion the court is concerned 
with keeping legislative committees mindful that the purpose 
is to legislate and not to inquire into a witness' private 
affairs. The courj implies that where the investigation is 
not concerned "with the power of Congress to inquire into 
and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency 
in agencies of the Governmentftthe informing function of 
Congress will not be tolerated where a committee sets out 
to grill a witness by inquiring into his private associations. 
In otherwords with the exceptions above noted, a legislative 
purpose is required in any investigation, and the informing 
function alone does not justify an investigation. 
The victory for individual rights is clear cut after 
reading this decision o But more important it was accomplished 
by adhering to a logical growth from precedent. The decisions 
from Kilbourn to Watkins are in keeping with the best traditions 
of stare decisis, but never sacrtficing an opportunity to 
improve what has gone on before. These decisions demonstrate 




and at the same time confi~ our belief that the United
States remains a demo~cracy that is a government of laws not
of men.
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